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SupraNova (Bridge)VerificationOverview

Verification

The message-passing layer on the destination chain verifies every message that crosses a SupraNova route, before any service-layer application acts on it. The verification method depends on the chain the message comes from.

Verification methods

MethodWhat is verifiedUsed for messages from
Ethereum consensusSync Committee signature, ancestry proof and receipt proofEthereum
Supra consensusSupra committee threshold signature and Merkle accumulator proofsSupraMVM and SupraEVM

Each hop is verified on its destination chain, by the method that matches the consensus of its source chain:

The SupraMVM ↔ SupraEVM hops are available on Testnet only. See Supported Networks. Architecture also lists the verifier contract or module used in each direction.

Trust assumptions

Each method rests on a different assumption about who could forge a message:

  • Ethereum consensus. The verifier accepts a message only if the configured share of Ethereum’s Sync Committee signed it. The Sync Committee is a group of 512 validators sampled from the full validator set. Forging a message would require that share of the committee to sign an invalid block.
  • Supra consensus. The verifier accepts a message only if a threshold signature of the active Supra validator committee covers it. Forging a message would require the committee to sign an invalid block. That would itself be a consensus safety failure of the Supra network.

The relayer that submits a message is never part of the trust assumption. The destination chain checks everything the relayer submits, and rejects a submission that fails verification.

Safety and liveness

A verifier can only fail in one of two ways:

  • Safety. An invalid message is accepted. The trust assumptions above prevent this failure. Replay protection also stops a valid message from being accepted twice. The verifier keeps it, except for messages from Ethereum, where the receiving application does.
  • Liveness. A valid message cannot be verified yet. This happens when no relayer has submitted it, or when the verifier’s record of the source chain’s consensus keys is out of date. Both roles are permissionless, so anyone can restore liveness by relaying the message or by updating the committee keys.

A liveness failure delays transfers but does not put funds at risk. Each direction of a route is verified independently, so an outage in one direction does not affect the other.

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