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SupraNova (Bridge)Security Model

Security Model

The security of a SupraNova transfer rests on three layers of protection:

  • Verification. The destination chain verifies every message before any application acts on it. The guarantees depend on the route’s verification method. Verification describes each method.
  • Economic limits. The service layer bounds how much value any single transfer, and any vault in total, can move.
  • Operational controls. Admin functions under multisig control can pause, configure and upgrade the contracts.

This page describes the threats that SupraNova is designed to withstand, and how SupraNova mitigates each one.

Forged consensus

The most serious threat to any bridge is a message for an event that never happened on the source chain. Under HyperNova, a forged message would have to carry valid consensus signatures from the source chain.

Messages from Ethereum. A forged message would require the Sync Committee to sign an invalid block header.

  • The verifier requires a minimum number of the 512 Sync Committee signatures. Finality lists the current threshold.
  • Sync Committee members are sampled from the full Ethereum validator set, so a colluding supermajority of a committee is improbable.
  • A colluding Sync Committee cannot alter Ethereum itself. It could only mislead a light client that accepts its signature.
  • The Token Bridge currently uses the Safe verification strategy. It accepts a block before Casper Friendly Finality Gadget (FFG) finality, once a later attested block is a set number of slots ahead. The admin can switch to the Finality strategy, which accepts only finalized blocks. See Finality.

Messages from Supra. A forged message would require the Supra validator committee to produce a threshold signature over an invalid block.

  • Such a signature would be a consensus safety failure of the Supra network itself, not only of the bridge.
  • The verifier admits a new committee only through a chain of Committee Authorization Certificates. The committee that the verifier already trusts signs each certificate, so an unauthorized committee cannot be registered.
  • The verifier rejects certificates from committees older than the configured epoch tolerance, so a retired committee’s keys cannot be used indefinitely.

See Ethereum Consensus Verification and Supra Consensus Verification for the full verification process.

Malicious or faulty relayers

Relaying is permissionless, so any party can submit messages, including incomplete, tampered or fabricated ones.

  • The destination chain verifies every submission. The verifier rejects a submission that fails verification without any effect on protocol state, and the relayer loses only its own transaction fee.
  • A relayer cannot alter a message’s contents, such as its amount or recipient, because the proofs cover those contents.
  • A relayer that stops operating does not block transfers: any other relayer can submit the same message.

Stale committee keys

Each verifier holds the consensus keys of the source chain. If the keys are not updated when the source chain’s committee rotates, the verifier cannot verify new blocks, and transfers in that direction pause. Committee Updaters lists how often each verifier’s keys rotate.

  • Committee updates are permissionless, and the verification fees fund a reward for each update. Any party can therefore submit the update that lets transfers resume.
  • The verifier accepts an update only if the current committee authorized it, so nobody can use an update to register arbitrary keys.
  • On the verifiers that hold the Supra committee, the admin can set the latest committee directly if updates have been missed for many epochs.

Stale keys delay transfers but put no funds at risk. Pending transfers complete once the keys are updated. See Committee Updaters.

Replay

A verified proof stays valid indefinitely, so a message must never be accepted twice. SupraNova records every processed message by its source chain, the consuming application and its message identifier, and rejects any repeat.

The verifier keeps this record, except for messages from Ethereum. For messages from Ethereum, the receiving application keeps the record: for token transfers, the Token Bridge on SupraMVM. Applications that receive messages from Ethereum must keep their own record. See Security Best Practices.

Over-release of funds

Even if every other control failed, the service layer limits how much value can leave the bridge:

  • Vault balance. A vault can release only assets it holds, so releases can never exceed what was previously locked.
  • Per-request limits. Each asset has a maximum amount per lock and per release.
  • Global caps. Each vault has a maximum total amount it will hold for each asset.
  • Wrapped-token limits. Wrapped tokens are burned rather than locked when they are sent. On SupraMVM and SupraEVM Devnet, each wrapped token therefore has its own maximum amount per send.

The current values are listed in Transfer Limits.

Operational controls

  • Pausing. The admin of the Token Bridge, of each vault and of each verifier can pause that contract or module to stop new transfers in an emergency.
  • Upgrades. The contracts on EVM chains are deployed behind upgradeable proxies, and the Move modules on SupraMVM are upgradeable.
  • Administration. Multisig accounts control the admin functions, including pausing, configuration and upgrades. See Roles and Permissions.
  • Audits. RektProof and QuillAudits have audited the SupraNova contracts. See Audit Reports.

Summary

ThreatMitigation
Forged consensus from EthereumRequired Sync Committee signatures (400 of 512 on Mainnet); configurable verification strategy
Forged consensus from SupraCommittee threshold signatures; authorized committee chain; epoch tolerance
Malicious relayersOn-chain verification of every submission; permissionless relaying
Stale committee keysPermissionless, rewarded Committee Updaters; admin recovery path
Replayed messagesRecord of processed messages per source chain, application and message identifier
Over-release of fundsVault balances, per-request limits, global caps and, on SupraMVM and SupraEVM Devnet, wrapped-token limits
Contract or operational incidentPausing, upgrades and administration under multisig control; independent audits

Each direction of a route is verified independently. An issue affecting one direction does not prevent the other from operating.

To report a vulnerability, see the Supra Bug Bounty .

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