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SupraNova (Bridge)VerificationEthereum Consensus Verification

Ethereum Consensus Verification

HyperNova verifies messages from Ethereum by running an Ethereum light client on the destination chain. The light client does not re-execute Ethereum blocks. It checks the signature of Ethereum’s Sync Committee over a block header, then proves that the message event is part of a block linked to that header.

The Ethereum → SupraMVM direction uses this method. The hypernova_core module on SupraMVM implements it.

The Sync Committee

Ethereum’s proof-of-stake consensus, Gasper, has two parts. Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget (Casper FFG) finalizes blocks. The Latest Message Driven Greedy Heaviest Observed SubTree (LMD-GHOST) rule chooses between forks.

Alongside Gasper, Ethereum maintains a Sync Committee: 512 validators, sampled from the full validator set, that sign the header of each new block. The following block includes their aggregate Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signature and a bitfield of the members that signed.

A new Sync Committee takes over every 256 epochs (8,192 slots, about 27 hours). The light client holds the public keys of the current committee and accepts a header only if it carries a valid aggregate signature from enough of its members.

ParameterMainnet
Sync Committee size512
Required signatures400 (approximately 78%)
Committee rotationEvery 256 epochs (~27 hours)

The admin can configure the required number of signatures. The value above is the one currently set on Mainnet. The verification strategy determines how long a transfer waits before it is accepted. See Finality.

Proof bundle

A relayer submits three proofs with each event:

ProofPurpose
Sync Committee signatureShows that the Sync Committee attested a recent block header.
Ancestry proofLinks the block that contains the event (the target block) to the attested block.
Receipt proofShows that the transaction in the target block succeeded and emitted the message event.

Together, the three proofs link the committee keys that the light client holds to the message event:

Ancestry proof

The Sync Committee attests to recent headers, so the target block is usually older than the attested block. The ancestry proof connects the two through the beacon state:

  • If the target block is within the last 8,192 slots of the attested block, the proof uses the block_roots vector.
  • If the target block is older, the proof uses the historical_summaries vector.

Receipt proof

The receipt proof is a Merkle Patricia Trie proof against the receipts root of the target block’s execution payload. It shows that the transaction succeeded and that it emitted the expected MessagePosted event from the registered Hypernova contract on Ethereum.

Ethereum’s Gloas upgrade changes where the receipts root is found. After Gloas, a beacon block no longer contains its own execution payload: the next block applies it. The verifier therefore proves the execution block hash through the following block, reads the receipts root from the execution header, and then checks the receipt proof.

The Testnet deployment, on Sepolia, already uses this format through the _v2 entry points. See Relayers. Mainnet keeps the earlier format until Gloas is activated on Ethereum Mainnet.

Committee updates

The light client must always hold the keys of the current Sync Committee. When the committee rotates, a permissionless Committee Updater submits the next committee’s public keys, together with a proof that the outgoing committee signed them. The verification fee funds the Committee Updater’s reward.

If nobody updates the keys, the light client cannot verify new Ethereum blocks. The Ethereum → SupraMVM direction then pauses until someone submits an update. No funds are at risk in the meantime. See Committee Updaters.

Edge cases

ScenarioHandling
The target block lacks a Sync Committee signatureThe ancestry proof links it to a later attested block.
The target block is older than 8,192 slotsThe ancestry proof uses historical_summaries.
The Sync Committee rotatesThe Committee Updater submits the new committee’s keys.
Too few Sync Committee members signedThe verifier rejects the submission. The relayer can use a later attested block.
A proof is invalid or tampered withThe verifier rejects the submission. The relayer loses only its gas.
The same message is submitted twiceThe receiving application rejects the repeat.
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